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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE MAIN PARKING MALL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION; 
SALT LAKE CITY COMMISSION IN 
ITS CAPACITY AS REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY; and 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, 
Defendant sand Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment made and 
entered on the 28th day of May, 1974, as amended 
on the 30th day of May, 1974, by the Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson, one of the Judges of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, determin-
ing that the Appellant's amended complaint did not 
state a cause of action. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, in its Judgment of Dismissal 
(R. 2), ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the Ap-
pellant's "amended complaint does not state a cause 
of action and is dismissed." 
Case No. 
13722 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks review and reversal of the 
Trial Court's Judgment of Dismissal, and for a rul-
ing by this Court that this case be remanded to the 
Trial Court so that the same may be tried on its 
merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant has alleged in its Amended Com-
plaint the following facts, which facts, the Appellant 
submits, are sufficient to state a cause of action 
against the Respondents. 
The Appellant is a Utah corporation. Its sole 
business has consisted of the ownership and manag-
ing of a parking area adjacent to the real property 
of the shareholders of the Appellant. 
The Appellant conducted a parking facility so 
that the general public would have access to retail 
establishments of the shareholders of the Appellant. 
The retail establishments are located on Main Street 
between Second and Third South Streets in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
The Respondent REDEVELOPMENT AGEN-
CY OF SALT LAKE CITY was created pursuant to 
the Utah Neighborhood Redevelopment Act known 
as Title 11, Chapter 19, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended). The Redevelopment Agency consists of 
the Salt Lake City Commission sitting in the capa-
2 
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city as the Redevelopment Agency, as provided for 
by Utah Code Annotated, § 11-19-2, 3. 
The Respondents, in accordance with law, 
adopted a plan of urban redevelopment known of-
ficially as CBD West, Neighborhood Development 
Program, Urban Renewal Plan, hereinafter referred 
to as CBD West. According to Utah law the Respon-
dents are given authority to borrow money for their 
projects from either public or private source, or from 
the state or federal government. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 11-19-3 (1953 as amended) provides in part: 
"The agency may accept financial or 
other assistance from any public or private 
source for the agency's activities, powers, and 
duties, and expend any funds so received for 
any of the purposes of this act. The agency 
may borrow or accept financial or other as-
istance from the state or the federal govern-
ment for any redevelopment project within 
(its area of) operation and comply with any 
conditions of such loan or grant. (Emphasis 
added). 
By virtue of the Utah law and by authority thereof 
the Respondents, for reasons of their own, elected 
to borrow money for CBD West, from the federal 
government (U. S. Housing of Urban Development 
or HUD), rather than from the state or other public 
source or from private sources. The Utah statute 
requires that if the Respondents elect to borrow from 
the federal government then they must " . . . comply 
with any conditions of such loan or grant." Id. In 
3 
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this case the federal government did require the 
Respondents to agree to comply with certain condi-
tions of the loan to the Respondents. These conditions 
are contained in what is called the Urban Renewal 
Handbook. In lending money for local projects like 
CBD West, the lender requires, as does the Utah 
Statute, that the local agencies follow the require-
ments of the conditions of such loan or grant. The 
conditions of the loan provide for the administration 
of federally assisted state and city programs. These 
conditions must be complied with by the Respondents 
for their local project. The obligation to follow these 
rules is imposed by Utah law which created the Re-
spondent and gave it power, and by the lender, HUD 
(R. 69). 
Sometime in 1973 the Redevelopment Agency 
filed an action to condemn the parking lot property 
owned by the Appellant. In settlement of the con-
demnation action the Appellant conveyed all of its 
right, title and interest in and to the parking area 
to the Respondent Redevopment Agency. The Rede-
velopment Agency wanted the property as project 
land for CBD West. 
As alleged in the Amended Complaint, there 
are several conditions which the Respondents agreed 
to comply with in offering project land to private 
redevelopers. The Appellant alleges that as a general 
condition to the loan from HUD, the Respondents 
must afford: 
4 
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"(a) potential redeveloper s the oppor-
tunity to make their interest known and (b) 
to consummate disposals of project land in a 
fair and equitable manner and to assure that 
they are open, in one way or another, to public 
scrutiny." (Emphasis added) (R. 70) 
The Handbook (R. 69) outlines six disposal methods 
which are designed by HUD to accomplish these ob-
jects. (R. 213) 
The Respondents by Resolution #32.02 dated 
February 8, 1973, which is attached as Exhibit A to 
the Appellant's Amended Complaint (R. 77), elected 
the "Competition-Negotiation" method of selecting 
a private redeveloper. The "Competition-Negotia-
tion" method is one of six standard methods in the 
Handbook. (R. 70, 213). The Respondents, however, 
without authority eliminated the bid price require-
ment of the "Competition-Negotiation" method. (R. 
69-70; 74,224). The Appellant alleges also that there 
are several detailed conditions which the Respon-
dents must comply with once they have selected a 
method of disposal. Among these requirements are 
that the Respondents must "Conform to the pro-
cedures and criteria it has adopted in making the 
offering, and in selecting the redeveloper." (R. 224-
225). 
The Respondents are required to adopt a Reso-
lution which shall: 
(a) approve the offering, 
(b) identify and approve the method of se-
lecting the redeveloper, 
5 
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(c) approve the price, or minimum price, 
and determine that such price is not less 
than fair value. (R. 216) 
The Resolution adopted by the Respondents (R. 77) 
did not approve a price, or minimum price for the 
land being offered. The contract entered into between 
the Respondents and Hartnett-Shaw Development 
Company, Inc. (R. 83) included a minimum price 
which was far below the market value of the land 
being offered. The contract allows the Respondent to 
sell the property at a price far below the market 
value. The purpose of the price being equal to the 
market value is to make sure that the loan can be 
repaid. This condition was not met by the Respon-
dents. 
As alleged the Respondents were also required 
as a condition to publish a formal notice known as an 
"Invitation for Proposals." (R. 73, 219-220,224). 
Certain information must be contained in this invi-
tation. Among other things, no formal public notice 
was published. The only thing published in a news-
paper was an advertisement. This advertisement did 
not contain, for example, the identification of the 
disposal method, nor a general description of the 
criteria and procedural steps pertinent to the se-
lected method. (R. 73, 219-220, 224). This informa-
tion must be published as a formal public notice 
known as an invitation for proposals. In addition 
another condition requires that "Offering Docu-
ments" be given to the prospective redevelopers, 
6 
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which also must contain certain information as al-
leged at R. 74 of the Amended Complaint. 
The Appellant has alleged that the Respondents 
did not prepare offering documents which contained 
all the necessary information required to give a po-
tential redeveloper a fair opportunity to present a 
proposed plan. (R. 74). 
The "Competition-Negotiation" method selected 
by the Respondents was a modified method which 
eliminated the bid-price requirement. The Respon-
dents did not get prior concurrence from the lender 
to change this method as is required. (R. 69, 213). 
The Handbook outlines in detail as conditions of the 
loan the requirements for using the "Competition-
Negotiation" combination. It is a two step method 
"designed to assure opportunity to all potential re-
developers to submit proposals . . . " The two steps 
are (1) public offering which requires bidding and 
(2) selection by negotiation. "The selected redevel-
oper must have submitted the highest bid among the 
bidders who met the bidding requirements" (R. 75, 
225). In addition the invitation for proposals under 
this method "shall indicate the extent and status of 
any discussions which have been held with prospec-
tive redevelopers at the time of the offering." (R. 
224). The Respondents as alleged in the Amended 
Complaint did not inform the Appellant of previous 
discussions it had had with Hartnett-Shaw Develop-
ment Company, Inc. prior to the offering as they 
were required to do. (R. 75). 
7 
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Without following any of the above described 
requirements, and prior to June 7, 1973, the Res-
pondent Agency circulated and distributed what it 
designated as a "data sheet", a copy of which is 
attached marked Exhibit C to the Appellant's 
Amended Complaint (R. 79). In addition, the Res-
pondent addressed a form letter dated June 5, 1973 
to Mr. I. J. Wagner, a director of the Appellant cor-
poration, a copy of which is attached to the Appel-
lant's Amended Complaint and marked Exhibit D 
(R. 80). Pursuant to the data sheet and the letter, 
the Appellant served upon the Respondent Agency 
on June 6, 1973, a Notice of Indication of Interest, 
a copy of which is attached to the Appellant's 
Amended Complaint and marked Exhibit E (R.82). 
The Appellant obtained an architect and prepared 
an informal plan of redevelopment and presented the 
plan to the Respondent Agency on July 25, 1973. 
The Respondent rejected the Appellant's pro-
posal even though the Appellant met all the condi-
tions of the offering and instead authorized the 
execution of an exclusive offer to negotiate with 
Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, Inc. of Chi-
cago, Illinois. No bid was submitted by Hartnett-
Shaw. The offer which was accepted by Hartnett-
Shaw was dated August 22, 1973, a copy of which is 
attached to the Appellant's Amended Complaint and 
market Exhibit F (R. 83). The Respondents granted 
to the Hartnett-Shaw Development Company an 
exclusive period of 180 days to negotiate and further 
8 
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provided that the said 180-day period could be ex-
tended. Several extensions have been granted since 
the conclusion of this initial 180-day period, and as 
yet the exclusive offer to negotiate is still in effect. 
The Appellant commenced this action against 
the Respondents by filing a Complaint on November 
9, 1973 (R. 200-232). An Order to Show Cause was 
served upon the Respondents and set for hearing on 
November 20, 1973, but upon motion by the Respon-
dent, the Order to Show Cause hearing was vacated 
and rescheduled for November 26, 1973 (R. 197). 
The Order to Show Cause hearing, however, was 
never held. The Appellant obtained an Order under 
Rule 30 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
take the deposition of Mr. Danny Wall, Executive 
Director of the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City, prior to the expiration of thirty days after ser-
vice of the Complaint (R. 177). On November 20, 
1973 the Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
Appellant's Complaint (R. 185). Submitted with the 
Motion to Dismiss were affidavits of Mayor E. J. 
Garn (R. 187) and Mr. Danny Wall (R. 194), and 
some other exhibits (R. 190-193). 
Pursuant to the Order dated November 20,1974 
(R. 177-178) the Appellant served notice on Novem-
ber 21, 1973 to take Mr. Wall's deposition (R. 162). 
The Respondents objected to the notice and set a 
hearing on their Motion for November 30, 1973 (R. 
164-161). The Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion to Vacate the Order to Show Cause were also 
9 
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set for hearing on November 30, 1973. Sometime 
prior to November 30th an Order was signed by the 
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson staying all discovery 
procedures. This Order does not appear in the Lower 
Court's record. It was, however, pursuant to this Or-
der, necessary that the Appellant file a Motion to 
Take Discovery, and a hearing was held before the 
Honorable Judge G. Hal Taylor on January 23, 1973 
(R. 109). Judge Taylor in an Order signed Febru-
ary 6, 1974 granted the Appellant the right to take 
discovery (R. 101). 
A hearing was held on November 30, 1973 (R. 
196), at which time the Appellant asked for leave to 
file written briefs in support of its objectives to the 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. It should be noted 
that the Respondents also filed an Answer on Novem-
ber 30, 1973 (R. 156). At the hearing the affidavits 
(R. 187, 194) and exhibits (R. 190-193) attached 
to the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss were not ex-
cluded by the Court. One December 20, 1973 the 
Appellant filed its Objectives to Respondents' Motion 
to Dismiss and filed a written memorandum in sup-
port of its objections (R. 131-148). The Respondents 
filed a memorandum in support of their Motion to 
Dismiss on December 26, 1973 (R. 124-130). 
Following Judge Taylor's Order granting the 
Appellant the right to take discovery, the Appellant 
teook the depositions of Mayor E. J. Garn, Danny 
Wall, and Ellis Ivory. On April 29, 1974, however, 
the Respondent filed a Notice of Further Hearing 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and a Request for Ruling on Its Motions (R. 98) .On 
the 14th day of May, 1974, the Appellant filed a 
Motion for Leave to Amend its Complaint (R. 63). 
Attached to the Motion was the Amended Complaint 
(R. 67-86) and Affidavits of W. Clark Burt (R. 65) 
and I. J. Wagner (R. 89). Prior to filing its Amended 
Complaint the Appellant filed a Notice to Take the 
Deposition of Mr. William F. Hartnett, Jr., Presi-
dent of Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, Inc. 
(R. 62). The Respondent noticed up these Motions 
for May 17, 1974 (R. 87). On May 15, 1974 the 
Appellant noticed the taking of Mr. Hartnett's depo-
sition (R. 62). The Respondents filed their objections 
to taking this deposition (R. 58) and an affidavit 
(R. 59) on May 16, 1974. 
At the hearing on May 17 the Appellant was 
granted leave to file an Amended Complaint, but was 
not allowed to take Mr. Hartnett's deposition (R. 
54). The Court set May 24 at 2:00 p.m. as the date 
for hearing Respondents' motions. On May 20, 1974, 
the Respondents filed their Answer to the Amended 
Complaint (R. 51-53) and also a Motion to Dismiss 
and for Summary Judgment (R. 49). Incorporated 
in this Motion were the same affidavits of Mayor 
E. J. Garn and Danny Wall which had been filed 
with the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss the original 
Complaint. On May 23, 1974, one day before the 
hearing, the Appellant was served with a supplemen-
tal affidavit signed by Mr. Danny Wall (R. 36-47) 
and also with Respondents' supplementary memor-
11 
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andum in support of their motions (R. 12). The 
Appellant filed on May 23 a Motion to Vacate the 
hearing which had been scheduled for the 24th of 
May and also a Motion to take Mr. Hartnett's depo-
sition (R. 10). 
On May 24, 1974 the hearing was held and 
Judge Jeppson entered his Judgment dismissing the 
Appellant's Amended Complaint for failure to state 
a cause of action (R. 2) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
THE APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The Respondent Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City, Utah is a creation of a Utah State Law. 
The Statute authorizing the creation of the Redevel-
opment Agency is entitled "The Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act", found in Title II, Chapter 19, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). Section 11-19-3 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended) says in part: 
"Each community, by enactment of an 
ordinance by its legislative body may desig-
nate the legislative body of the community as 
a redevelopment agency of such community, 
which agency shall be authorized to enter into 
contracts generally, and shall have the power 
to transact the business and exercise all the 
powers provided for in this Act. * * * " 
12 
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The legislative body in this case is the Salt Lake 
City Commission which has, by ordinance, desig-
nated itself as the Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City. Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-2(2) (1953 as 
amended). Pursuant to Utah law, therefore, the Salt 
Lake City Commission acting as the Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City can enter into redevelop-
ment projects. 
The "Utah Neighborhood Development Act" 
also allows the Redevelopment Agency to accept fi-
nancial assistance from any public or private source 
for redevelopment activities. Utah Code Anno. 
(1953) § 11-19-3 also provides: 
" . . . The agency may accept financial or 
other assistance from any public or private 
source for the agencies activities, powers, and 
duties, and expend any funds so received for 
any of the purposes of this Act. The agency 
may borrow money or accept financial or other 
assistance from the State or Federal govern-
ment for any redevelopment project within 
conditions of such loan or grant" (Emphasis 
added). 
The Appellant has alleged in its Amended Com-
plaint that the Salt Lake City Commission acting in 
its capacity as the Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City can be sued in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
This allegation is based upon the fact that the Re-
development Agency of Salt Lake City is a public 
agency created by the Salt Lake City Commission 
pursuant to Utah Statute. 
13 
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The Appellant's Amended Complaint does state 
a cause of action against the named Respondents. 
This Court has held in Blackman v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 
2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955), that a complaint does 
not fail to state a claim, "unless it appears to a cer-
tainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no re-
lief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of the claim.'' 
In this case it does not appear to a certainty that 
The Main Parking Mall would be entitled to no relief 
under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of its claim. On the contrary, it does appear 
that the Appellant would be entitled to relief if the 
allegations in the Amended Complaint could be 
proved. The Appellant has alleged in its Amended 
Complaint the jurisdictional prerequisites for bring-
ing this lawsuit in the District Court for Salt Lake 
County. The Respondents are public agencies exist-
ing by virtue of Utah State Laws. The Respondent 
Redevelopment Agency is the Salt Lake City Com-
mission acting in another capacity. The Appellant 
has alleged that the Redevelopment Agency has en-
tered into certain contracts and agreements with the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment for financial assistance for the Respondents' 
project, and that the Agency has received funds for 
its redevelopment projects. The Appellant is not at-
tacking any of the agreements entered into between 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment and the Respondents. In fact the Appellant 
14 
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admits that the Respondents have authority to " . U 
borrow money or accept financial or other assistance 
from the state or the federal government for any 
redevelopment project within (its area of) opera-
tion . . . " This authority is granted by Section 11-
19-3 of Utah Code Annotated (1953). The same sta-
tute, however, also provides that when this financial 
assistance is received from the state or federal gov-
ernment, the "agency", or in this case the Respon-
dents, must " . . . comply with any conditions of such 
loan or grant." The Appellant has alleged in its 
Amended Complaint that there are certain condi-
tions in this case which the Agency has not complied 
with. These conditions are the Rules and Regulations 
issued by the lender, HUD, in its Urban Renewal 
Handbook, which Handbook is the official statement 
of HUD concerning the policies and requirements for 
the administration of HUD assisted local urban re-
newal programs. The CBD West, Neighborhood Re-
development Program, Urban Renewal Plan adopted 
by the Respondents is financially assisted by HUD. 
"The Handbook is the basic issuance used to promul-
gate permanent policy and requirements for admin-
istrative officials, and it establishes . . . detailed re-
quirements.'1 (R. 69). (Emphasis added). The local 
agency is required to take action in accordance with 
the " . . . Handbook policies and requirements," when 
it accepts financial assistance from the federal gov-
ernment. The Appellant is not alleging that the CBD 
West project is a federal project. It is a local project 
15 
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adopted by the Respondents. For reasons of their 
own the Respondents elected to borrow money from 
the federal government to finance this local project. 
Utah law requires that any conditions attached to 
this federal money must be complied with by the 
Respondents. The Appellant is alleging that there 
are several conditions and that the Respondents did 
not " . . . comply with . . . the . . . conditions of such 
loan ..." Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-3 (1953 as amend-
ed). 
The Appellant has also alleged that pursuant to 
these conditions the Respondents selected a method 
entitled the "Competition-Negotiation" method of 
selecting a redeveloper, which is one of six methods 
outlined in the Handbook. As alleged the "Compe-
tition-Negotiation" method requires two steps, i.e., 
(1) public offering with bidding requirements and 
(2) selection by negotiation (R. 75, 225). According 
to the Handbook "(A)ny material deviations or de-
partures . . . " from the six standard methods " . . . 
require prior Regional Office concurrence." (R. 69, 
225-226). 
It is also alleged in the Amended Complaint that 
the Respondents materially deviated from the se-
lected method of choosing a redeveloper. In fact the 
Redevelopment Agency eliminated the bid price re-
quirement (R. 190). This material deviation was 
made without prior Regional Office concurrence. The 
resolution adopted by the Respondents (R. 190) also 
failed to "approve the price (of the land to be of-
16 
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ered), or minimum price, and determine that such 
price is not less than fair value/' as required by the 
conditions of the loan from the federal government. 
These violations of the Handbook, i.e., the "condi-
tions", of the " . . . loan or grant," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 11-19-3 (1953), are but a few of the violations 
alleged in the Amended Complaint. The Respondents 
did not comply with the conditions as required by § 
11-19-3. The Urban Renewal Handbook makes it 
clear that the disposal methods were adopted by 
HUD to afford "(a) potential redevelopers the op-
portunity to make their interest known and (b) to 
consummate disposals of project land in a fair and 
equitable manner and to consummate disposals of 
project land in a fair and equitable manner and to 
assure that they are open, in one way or another, to 
public scrutiny." (R. 70). 
The Respondents, pursuant to its resolution 
adopting a modified "Competition-Negotiation" 
method, circulated what is designated as a Data 
Sheet, which Data Sheet was an invitation for rede-
velopers to submit informal proposals to the Respon-
dents (R. 79). The Main Parking Mall was interested 
in redeveloping the project land. They responded to 
the Data Sheet by sending a Notice of Indication of 
Interest (R. 82), and on July 25,1973, the Appellant 
presented an informal proposal to the Respondent 
Agency. The Amended Complaint further alleges 
that The Main Parking Mall proposal was rejected 
and that The Main Parking Mall was not dealt with 
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by the Respondents in a fair and equitable manner, 
as required by law as a condition to the federal gov-
ernment lending money to the Respondents. The 
Appellant was led to believe by the information 
given to it by the Respondents that only informal 
proposals were to be presented. Instead, as alleged 
in the Amended Complaint, the Respondents granted 
to Hartnett-Shaw an exclusive right to negotiate, 
which offer the Respondent Redevelopment Agency 
did not have the authority to give. The Respondents 
rejected the Appellant's informal proposal without 
giving it the opportunity to present a formal pro-
posal. The Data Sheet says in part: 
"The Redevelopment Agency reserves the 
right to reject any or all proposals, but by 
July 16, 1973, intends to select developers 
from whom final proposals will be requested." 
(R. 79). (Emphasis added). 
Also the letter dated June 5, 1973 (R. 80) says 
in part: 
"Your proposal may be in whatever de-
tail you may wish and is intended to assist 
you and the Agency in determining the extent 
of your interest, the feasibility of your pro-
posal, and tvhether or not the Agency wishes 
to request that you submit a formal proposal 
at a later date.'9 (R. 80-81). (Emphasis ad-
ded). 
The Appellant admits that according to the Hand-
book the Redevelopment Agency reserves the right 
to reject any or all proposals. But the Handbook re-
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quires that certain conditions must be met before a 
proposal can be rejected: 
"The integrity of the program, locally 
and nationally, and the development of a mar-
ket for urban renewal land, dictate that this 
right (right to reject proposals) be exercised 
sparingly and only in cases where the pro-
posals do not meet the terms and conditions of 
the offering, do not provide the minimum ap-
proved prices, nor achieve the announced 
objectives of the offering" (R. 74, 214). 
It is alleged in the Amended Complaint that the 
Appellant did meet all the terms of the offering, i.e., 
to present an informal proposal. The Respondents 
rejected the proposal without the conditions being 
met. There was no "minimum approved price" set 
nor were there any "announced objectives of the 
offering" as required by the Handbook. The Hand-
book details all the requirements to be put in the 
"Invitation for Proposals" and the "Offering Docu-
ments." (R. 73-74; 219-223). The Appellant was 
never informed, for example, of the disposal method 
nor the "description of the criteria and procedural 
steps pertinent to the selected method." (R. 74; 219-
223). 
If the Appellant's evidence will support its alle-
gations, it cannot be said with a certainty that The 
Main Parking Mall is not entitled to the relief 
sought. Blackman v. Snelgrove, supra. It is clear 
that the Amended Complaint does state a cause of 
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action against the Respondents and the Lower Court 
erred in dismissing the Amended Complaint. 
Count II of the Amended Complaint (R. 73) 
sets forth the conditions that were not followed by 
the Respondents in selecting the redeveloper for this 
project property. The Appellant is claiming that 
since these conditions were not complied with, it was 
not given a fair opportunity to compete or to present 
a proposal to develop the project land. The property 
was not disposed of in a fair and equitable manner 
and the Appellant was not given a fair opportunity 
to make its proposal and interests known. The 
Amended Complaint alleges that the Respondents 
had prior dealings with Hartnett-Shaw Development 
Company, Inc. and that the Appellant was not in-
formed of any prior discussions with the other re-
developers. This in itself is a violation of the condi-
tions of the loan. (R. 224). The Appellant is assert-
ing its right as a potential redeveloper to be dealt 
with in a fair and equitable manner. 
Now assuming that the Appellant could prove 
that the Respondents were required to comply with 
the conditions of the loan they received from the 
federal government and that they did not comply 
with these conditions in dealing with the Appellant, 
and that the Appellant was thereby damaged and 
severly hampered in its attempt to purchase the 
property for redevelopment purposes, the Appellant 
has a cause of action against the Respondents and 
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would be entitled to the relief prayed for. The Ap-^  
pellant is asking that the Redevelopment Agency be 
required to follow the Utah law, § 11-19-3 Utah Code 
Ann. which requires than when federal funds are 
being used by the Respondents organized under Utah 
law, that they would comply with the "conditions 
of such loan . . . " The Appellant is asking nothing 
more in its Amended Complaint than to give it a fair 
and equitable opportunity to submit a proposal and 
a bid in fair competition with other redevelopers. 
As a bidder the Appellant is entitled to bring this 
suit to require the Respondents to comply with the 
Utah law and the rules and regulations imposed 
upon them by HUD. In order to accomplish this the 
contract with Hartnett-Shaw must be declared to be 
invalid, and the Respondents must be ordered to fol-
low the conditions of the grant which it has received 
from the Federal Government. The Respondents 
have abused their authority and powers to the detri-
ment of the Appellant in selecting a redeveloper and 
granting to Hartnett-Shaw an exclusive right to ne-
gotiate. The Respondents should not be allowed to 
abuse their authority and then be relieved of any 
and all obligation to answer for their abuses. There 
is no other remedy available to the Appellant if the 
Judgment of Dismissal is allowed to stand, and the 
Respondents will have abused their powers without 
having to be subject to judicial review. 
Applying the test outlined in Blackham v. SneU 
grove, supra, it is clear that the Appellant's Amended 
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Complaint does state a cause of action and that the 
Ltiwer Court erred in dismissing it. 
POINT I (A) 
THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HAS JURISDIC-
TION IN THIS CASE. THE APPELLANT IS SEEKING 
TO ENFORCE A UTAH STATUTE, I.E., SECTION 
11-19-3 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1 9 5 3 WHICH 
REQUIRES THAT A NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY COMPLY WITH RULES AND REG-
ULATIONS ACCOMPANYING THE GRANTING OF 
FEDERAL FUNDS TO THE LOCAL AGENCY. 
The Respondents in their Motion to Dismiss 
asserted as one of their grounds for dismissal that 
the Appellant had no standing to bring this action. 
In its Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dis-
miss (R. 12) the Respondents asserted that the Ap-
pellant had no standing. In support of this conten-
tion they relied almost exclusively on Johnson v. 
Redevelopment Agency of the City of Oakland, 317 
Fed. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963) Cert, denied, 375 U.S. 
915 (1963). In Johnson the plaintiffs were being dis-
placed as a result of an urban renewal project cre-
ated by the local agency in Oakland, California. They 
were suing on the theory that the agency had not 
complied with the federal statutes governing the re-
location of persons displaced by renewal projects. A 
comment i n ^ L R Fed. 415, Section 3 (a) says: 
"Standing to raise constitutional claims against ur-
ban renewal projects has been summarily denied in 
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other cases, which, however, appear not to represent 
the trend of current judicial thinking." Several cases 
have been decided since Johnson which grants stand-
ing to plaintiffs in situations identical to those of the 
plaintiffs in Johnson. Also the federal statutes have 
been amended since Johnson to make more clear the 
congressional intent to protect interests of residents 
about to be displaced. In Western Additional Com-
munity Organization v. Weber, 249 Fed. Supp. 433 
(D. C. Cal. 1968), the plaintiffs were displaced and 
alleged noncompliance with federal laws made for 
such displacees. The court said that federal admin-
istrative action is subject to judicial review unless 
the statute itself precludes such review, or when 
agency action is commited to agency discretion un-
der law. The Federal Housing Act of 1949, cited by 
the Respondents, does neither and the court ruled 
that the plaintiffs were entitled to judicial review. 
This court cited the Johnson case but said that since 
1963 when Johnson was decided, the Federal Hous-
ing Act had been amended to make the congressional 
intent to protect interests of displaced residents more 
clear, and that the U.S. Supreme Court had signifi-
cantly broadened the concept of standing to sue. 
Judicial review of agency action is allowed ex-
cept where: "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; 
or (2) agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701. See also 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702, 
704. The Federal Housing Act of 1949 does not 
either preclude judicial review or grant agency dis-
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cretion. Therefore, judicial review has been allowed 
in several cases, such as Norwalk Core v. Norwalk 
Redevelopment Agency, 395 Fed. 2d 920 (2d Cir. 
1968); and Powelleton Civil Home Owners Associa-
tion v. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, 284 Fed. Supp. 809 (D.C. Pa. 1968). Even 
though the U.S. Supreme Court has not expressly 
ruled on this question, recent decisions of that Court 
presage no disagreement with the position taken by 
some of the lower federal courts in respect of stand-
ing to seek judicial review of agency action in urban 
renewal projects. Respondents have admitted in 
their memorandum in support of its motion to dis-
miss (R. 12) that if the contract entered into by the 
Redevelopment Agency was illegal because it vio-
lated state law, then the court would have jurisdic-
tion and power to hold such contracts invalid. That is 
precisely what the Appellant is submitting in this 
case. The Redevelopment Agency has violated state 
law in that it has not met the requirements of Sec-
tion 11-19-3 of the Neighborhood Development Act. 
If the Redevelopment Agency did not comply with 
the conditions of the federal grant then it is in viola-
tion of the state statute. The Appellant is not claim-
ing a violation of the Housing Act of 1949 nor claim-
ing violation of any of the agreements between the 
Respondents and HUD. The Respondents' reliance 
upon Johnson, therefore, is misplaced. The Appellant 
is not seeking relief against a federal official or a 
federal agency administering federal laws. 
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Salt Lake City is a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah and is amenable to suit in the courts 
of this state. Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 10-7-1 
(1953) says: "Cities and towns shall be bodies poli-
tic and corporate with perpetual succession. They 
shall be known and designated by the name and style 
adopted, and under such name may sue and be sued, 
* * *." The Respondent Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City exists under the provisions of the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act, Title 11, 
Chapter 19, Utah Code Annotated (1953) and is, 
in fact the Salt Lake City Commission acting in the 
capacity as the Redevelopment Agency. The Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act makes no provision 
for administrative review of agency actions compar-
able to that provided in connection with other state 
agencies and which, in challenges to actions of such 
state agencies is prerequisite to judicial review. The 
Appellant here asserts that the Respondents, as bod-
ies politic of the State of Utah or agencies or divi-
sions thereof, are within the personal jurisdiction of 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, and that the 
subject matter of this suit, i.e., the activities of the 
Respondents in carrying out the requirements of the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act, is within jur-
isdiction of the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
The Appellant is not attempting to incorporate the 
federal regulations into the state law. The Respon-
dents do, however, have the responsibility of comply-
ing with the conditions of any assistance it receives 
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from government or private source. The Appellant is 
entitled to the opportunity to present its case at trial 
and attempt to prove that the Redevelopment Agency 
has in fact received federal funds and that certain 
conditions are attached to the receiving of these 
funds, and that the Redevelopment Agency has not 
complied with these conditions and has not disposed 
of the project land in a fair and equitable manner 
as is required by the regulations. If those require-
ments are not met, then the Redevelopment Agency 
is in violation of the state statute which imposes 
upon them a mandate to comply. 
The Appellant has alleged in its Amended Com-
plaint that it is a Utah Corporation, and that its sole 
business has been the maintenance of parking facil-
ities on property now located within the redevelop-
ment project, said parking facilities providing 
intra-block entry into the stores owned or leased by 
the shareholders of the Appellant. The Redevelop-
ment Agency condemned that property and to avoid 
a condemnation suit the Appellant entered into an 
agreement wherein reasonable compensation was 
paid to the Appellant for the project land. The Ap-
pellant did not, however, terminate its interest in 
that land simply because it was sold to the Redevelop-
ment Agency. The Redevelopment Agency did not 
give the Appellant an opportunity to bid, in accor-
dance with law, or to make its interest known, or to 
present a proposal for the redevelopment of this 
project property. The Appellant is only asking that 
the law and conditions be complied with so that the 
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Appellant can have an opportunity to compete to 
acquire the project land for redevelopment purposes. 
POINT I (B) 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAIL-
URE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION WAS IN EF-
FECT A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 12 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure says in part: 
"If, on a motion asserting the defense 
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for sum-
mary judgment and disposed of as provided 
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." 
(Emphasis added). 
On May 20, 1974 the Respondents filed their 
motion to dismiss the Appellant's Amended Com-
plaint (R. 49). Incorporated in its motions were the 
affidavits of Mayor E. J. Garn and Danny Wall 
which had been previously filed with the Respon-
dents' Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint. 
Also a supplemental affidavit signed by Danny Wall 
was included in the record in support of the Respon-
dents' motions (R. 24). In addition to these affidavits 
several exhibits were also made a part of the record. 
The affidavits of Mayor E. J. Garn and Danny Wall 
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and the exhibits were "matters outside the pleadings 
. . . presented to and not excluded by the court , . . . " 
The Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12 (b) (6) therefore be-
came a Motion for Summary Judgment and must be 
governed by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Rule 56 (c) says that a summary judgment can 
only be rendered if there is "no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law." The 
Appellant submits that there are several genuine 
factual issues and that the Respondents are not 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Trial 
Court's Judgment of Dismissal of the Amended 
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action is 
tantamount to a judgment on the merits. A motion 
under Rule 12 (b) usually raises a matter of abate-
ment and a dismissal for any of the reasons listed 
in that rule will not prevent the claim being reas-
serted once the defect is remedied. Thus a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter or personal juris-
diction, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 only 
contemplates a dismissal of the proceedings, not a 
judgment on the merits for either party. Similarly, 
although a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b) (6) 
for failure to state a claim itself, the movement 
merely is asserting that the pleading to which the 
motion is directed does not sufficiently state a claim 
for relief. Unless the motion is converted into one 
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for summary judgment as permitted by the last 
sentence of Rule 12 (b), it does not challenge the 
actual existence of a meritorious claim. The motion 
under Rule 12 (b) (6) only entails an examination 
of the sufficiency of the pleadings unless converted 
to a motion for summary judgment. A motion for 
summary judgment typically is based on the plead-
ings and any affidavits, depositions, and other forms 
of evidence relevant to the merits of the challenged 
claim or defense that are available at the time the 
motion is made. The Lower Court is saying then that 
on the basis of the record as it presently exists, there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the Respondents are entitled to a judgment on the 
merits as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court 
has ruled that a sumary judgment is proper only if 
the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions 
show that there is no genuine issue of any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law. In re Williams7 Estates, 10 
Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683. Hatch v. Sugarhouse 
Finance Company, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 758. 
The record shows that there are several genuine is-
sues of fact which cannot be dismissed summarily. 
In addition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by 
the Respondents, they also filed an Answer to the 
Amended Complaint of Appellant (R. 51), in which 
Respondents denied they have failed to comply with 
essential provisions of the Handbook, which Appel-
lant has alleged they must comply with. Respondents 
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raised the issue that any breach by the Respondents 
with HUD or with any regulations affecting such 
contractual relationships is not a proper basis upon 
which Appellant may rely in pursuing the relief as 
sought in said Amended Complaint. The Appellant 
has alleged that Respondents are required to follow 
certain procedures, rules and regulations, and has 
alleged that Respondents have not done so. The Re-
spondents, by their Answer to the Amended Com-
plaint, have denied that they have not complied. This 
is one of the main issues raised by the Appellant, 
and which is denied by the Respondents. Issues of 
fact are clearly created by the Amended Complaint 
and the Answer to the Amended Complaint. 
An answer denying specific allegations raises 
genuine issues of material facts. Therefore, Respon-
dents cannot as a matter of law be granted a sum-
mary judgment. 
SUMMARY 
The Trial Court committed error in dismissing 
Appellant's Amended Complaint. The Amended 
Complaint states a cause of action against the Re-
spondents; the Answer to Amended Complaint by 
Respondents creates an issue as to material facts. 
Under no condition could it be said with a cer-
tainty that the Appellant is not entitled to relief 
under any state of facts as alleged in its Amended 
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Complaint. The Appellant in substance has alleged 
that Respondents have not complied with the law of 
Utah by which it was created, and its powers given. 
The Respondents claim they have complied. There is 
no federal law involved; the only law involved is the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act, Title 11, 
Chapter 19, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). The issue is whether or not the Respon-
dents have abided by the Utah law and the regula-
tions and agreements entered into with HUD. The 
Appellant was an invited bidder, invited by the 
Respondents, and is entitled to have the rules and 
regulations and the law complied with. It certainly 
has a right as an invited bidder to submit a bid in 
accordance with the Utah law and regulations of 
HUD, and when the Respondents do not follow the 
rules and regulations under the law in the perfor-
mance of the choosing of the bidder, Appellant has a 
right of action. 
The Trial Court committed error in dismis-
sing the Appellant's Amended Complaint, and The 
Main Parking Mall asks this Court to reverse the 
Lower Court's ruling and remand this case to the 
Lower Court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, GREENE & 
NEBEKER 
By Louis H. Callister, Sr. 
W. Cark Burt 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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